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Abstract—The advent of virtual machine technology for exam-
ple, VMware, and container technology, such as Docker, have
made the migration of services between different Cloud Systems
possible. This enables the development of mobile services that
can ensure low latencies between servers and their mobile clients
resulting in better Quality of Service. Though there are many
mechanisms in place to provide support for mobile services, a
key component that is missing is the development of security
protocols that allow the safe transfer of servers to different Cloud
environments. In this paper, we propose a Resource Allocation
Security Protocol for secure service migration. We explore two
approaches: in the first approach, the protocol is developed and
formally verified by the Automated Validation of Internet Security
Protocols and Applications tool. The protocol satisfies the security
properties of secrecy and authentication. In addition, nonces are
used for replay protection and to ensure freshness. In the second
approach, a secure symmetrical session key is used to do the
safe transfer and an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier,
ProVerif, is employed to verify secrecy, authentication and key
exchange.
Keywords—Mobile services, Security protocol, Vehicular Cloud,
Avispa and ProVerif.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing facilitates the migration of data and services.
This gives many incentives for data owners to migrate their
data and services to Cloud storage platforms at low cost. In
this brave new world, Cloud Providers will actively advertise
their Cloud resources to Mobile Service Providers who can use
these advertisements to dynamically migrate their servers to
these Clouds. In this environment, mobile users will demand to
be always connected using heterogeneous networking. Mobile
devices will, therefore, have several wireless interfaces includ-
ing Wi-Fi, LTE, 5G, satellite and Ultra-wideband interfaces.
These networks will seamlessly work together using vertical
handover techniques [13]. The Y-Comm architecture [12] has
been developed to build future mobile systems that can provide
seamless communications. Hence, future mobile systems will
need to support both mobile users and services. Though exten-
sive work has been done to support mobile users, less work has
been done on the development of mobile services. However,
there is now increasing interest in this area as there is a need
to provide services at the edge of the network, i.e. to support
edge-computing. One aspect of the research on mobile services
that has been inadequate is support for security. In particular, it
is important that servers do not end up being hosted on unsafe
Cloud infrastructure which can hamper service delivery to
mobile clients and also Clouds do not end up hosting malicious
servers which can damage Cloud infrastructure. This paper
attempts to address these issues by providing a new security
protocol for secure service migration. This security protocol
is called the Resource Allocation Security Protocol (RASP)
for secure service migration over Cloud infrastructure [15].
The protocol is developed and tested through a simulation
study using the Automated Validation of Internet Security
Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool which is used for
the analysis of large-scale Internet security protocols and
applications. In the second approach, the ProVerif tool, which
verifies cryptographic protocols and associated security goals,
is employed. Using both techniques, this paper shows that the
RASP protocol can be used to securely migrate services to
different Cloud environments.The rest of the paper is organised
as follows: Section II presents the related work; Section III
details the solution approach while Sections IV and V describe
our first and second attempts of RASP, evaluation and show
the results. Section VI details of the applications of RASP to
a Vehicular Testbed. The paper concludes with Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Service migration has been proposed for many environments
and is increasingly being used in Cloud infrastructure. Y-
Comm is an architecture that has been designed to build hetero-
geneous mobile networks [11]. It offers the most functionality
and flexibility in terms of communication, mobility, QoS and
security. Lately, a new Service-Oriented Architecture [17] that
allows services to be managed, copied or migrated to support
mobile users, has been proposed. This framework takes into ac-
count recent efforts in the area of seamless connectivity across
heterogeneous networks, as well as increasing capabilities of
Cloud technology. Edge computing, where servers are placed
on Clouds close to the edge rather than at the centre of the
Internet [16] to reduce delays, has been growing rapidly. Edge
computing also enables support for networks in highly mobile
environments such as Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs).
Though all these mechanisms are promising developments [2],
it is necessary to consider security as a key part of the overall
design.
III. SOLUTION APPROACH
In this section, we look at protocols for secure service migra-
tion [8]. As stated previously, the main issues are fraudulent
Cloud providers that attempt to entice service providers to host
their services on faulty Cloud facilities resulting in data loss
and lack of service as well as misbehaving services which
attempt to convince Cloud providers that they are well-behaved
systems leading to mismanagement and abuse of Cloud facil-
ities. In our new approach [10], we are working on secure
service migration between commercial Cloud infrastructures.
The RASP protocol has been developed to support mobile
services that allow the safe transfers of resources to different
Cloud environments. The protocol is broken into four stages to
clarify the necessary operations involved in secure migration.
1) Stage1: Advertisement:
Cloud CB actively advertises its resources which is
picked up by server SA on Cloud CA.
2) Stage2: Authentication of SA and CB as well as
migration request and response:
Server SA first requests the Registry to authenticate
Cloud CB and the resources it holds. Once it receives
the approval from the Registry, it sends a migration
request to Cloud CB. Cloud CB then requests the
Registry to authenticate server SA and the resources
it requires. Once this is verified, Cloud CB sends a
positive migration response to server SA.
3) Stage3: Migration transfer:
Server SA sends a message to Cloud CB to begin the
migration transfer. Cloud CB begins the transfer and
signals server SA when the transfer is completed.
4) Stage4: Update of New service location to the
Registry:
The new service SB is now running on Cloud CB
and informs the Registry that it has been successfully
migrated.
IV. FIRST ATTEMPT
In the RASP protocol [10], the system is moving server SA on
Cloud CA to Cloud CB. There are three entities in the protocol:
server SA on Cloud CA, Cloud CB, and the Registry.
A. General Notations
1) Server resources: The server (SA) is represented by: Server
on Cloud A (SA) = Server ID, TOS=Server, PKS, Resources.
2) Cloud Facilities:
1) Cloud A(CA) = Cloud IDA, TOS = Cloud, PKA,
Resources.
2) Cloud B(CB) = Cloud IDB, TOS = Cloud, PKB,
Resources.
Each Cloud is uniquely identified by a Cloud ID and since
they are Cloud services, TOS = Cloud; PKA and PKB are
public keys for Cloud CA and Cloud CB respectively. In
addition, each Cloud will have a number of resources which
it actively advertises to servers.
3) The Registry: The Registry is the last key component and
is used to verify the identities of all servers on the network. In
addition, the Registry knows the services on different Clouds
and has the public keys for each service. We represent the
public key for the registry as PKR.
4) Nonces and Timestamps: Nonces (NA and NB) are ran-
domly generated numbers which are unforgeable and are used
as session tokens, ensuring that requests cannot be repaid by
unauthorised personnel. Timestamps TA, TB & Tcomp are
used to measure the time taken for the process. TA is the
time when the server makes the migration request to Cloud
CB. TB is the time when Cloud CB responds to the server
request. Tcomp is the time when transfer is completed.
B. Algorithm 1 RASP Protocol
This is our first attempt to implement the service migration
framework using the protocol. In this section, we look at when
the service moves from Cloud CA to Cloud CB. In this attempt,
Stage 1 in the previous Table 1, corresponds to step 1 of the
protocol; Stage 2 corresponds to steps 2-7; Stage 3 corresponds
to steps 8 and 9 and finally the Stage 4 corresponds to step 10.
The protocol is followed in exactly the same way as outlined
below.
• Stage 1
1. CB → SA : Advertisement (Cloud IDB, TOS,
Resources, PKB)
• Stage 2
2. SA→ R : Verify Identity (Cloud IDB, TOS, PKB,
Resources, Server ID, PKS) PKR
3. R → SA : Message: YES (Cloud IDB, TOS, PKB,
Valid Resources) PKS
4. SA → CB : Migration Request (Server ID, TOS,
TA, Req Resources, PKS, NA) PKB
5. CB → R : Verify Identity (Server ID, PKS, TOS,
Cloud IDB, PKB) PKR
6. R → CB : Message: Yes (Server ID, TOS, Valid
Req Resources(services)) PKB
7. CB → SA : Migration Response (Cloud IDB,
TOS= Cloud, TB, Resources Granted, NA, NB) PKS
• Stage 3
8. SA → CB : Transfer Migration (Server ID,
Cloud IDB, Req Resources, NB) PKB
9. CB → SA : Transfer Ack (Server ID, Cloud IDB,
Tcomp) PKS
• Stage 4
10. SB→ R : Transfer-Comp (Server ID, Cloud IDB,
TOS, TA, TB, Tcomp) PKR.
C. The full explanation of this migration is given below
• Step 1 Server SA on Cloud A receives advertisements
from Cloud B advertising its resources.
• Step 2 Server SA checks the validity of Cloud B.
• Step 3 The Registry authenticates Cloud B.
• Step 4 Server SA sends a request to migrate to Cloud
B.
• Step 5 Cloud B sends a request to the Registry, to
make sure that the server SA is a valid requested
service.
• Step 6 The Registry validates server SA.
• Step 7 Cloud B signals to server SA that it is OK to
migrate the requested service to Cloud B.
• Step 8 Server SA signals to Cloud B to migrate the
service.
• Step 9 Cloud B signals to server SA that the migration
is complete: The service is now started on Cloud B.
Hence, new location: (SA → SB)
• Step 10 The new server (SB) on Cloud B signals to
the Registry that the migration has been completed.
Figure 1 shows the steps for Cloud-to-Cloud migration of
services.
Figure 1: First Attempt Migration between SA to CB
D. Evaluation of the First Attempt
There are important observations to be made with this protocol.
Firstly, nonces are used to protect the interaction between
server SA and Cloud CB to which the server wants to
migrate. This is done using an extended approach based on
the Needham Schroeder protocol [3]. In step 4, the server uses
NA as part of the transfer request. In step 7, Cloud B replies to
the server using NA and NB as part of the transfer response.
In step 8, server authorises the transfer of the service to Cloud
B using NB.
E. AVISPA Results
In our first attempt, AVISPA [4] was used to analyse the
protocol specified in the previous section. AVISPA provides
automated validation of Internet security protocols and ap-
plications. Here, we represent the formal specification and
verification which is carried out using the role-based language,
HLPSL and the AVISPA model checker which automates
the model checking of the protocol and uses the parameters
necessary for the formal verification of RASP. The first step
was to validate the specification using the OFMC back-end tool
of AVISPA, and the second step was to use the ATSE back-end.
In our protocol, AVISPA outputs SAFE from OFMC Figure 2
and ATSE Figure 3. Hence both protocols show SAFE [10] so
the expected result is accomplished.
Using the AVISPA tool, we are able to show that the protocol
specified is safe against imposter attacks in normal operation.
However, in order to create a complete security framework
for Cloud Systems [9], we also need to look at verification
of the cryptographic protocols. ProVerif is used for automati-
cally analysing the security of cryptographic protocols. In our
second attempt, we used the ProVerif tool to fully verify the
interaction for secure service migration including the security
Figure 2: OFMC: Cloud A to Cloud B
Figure 3: ATSE: Cloud A to Cloud B
properties such as the services, nonces, private keys, ses-
sion keys, signatures, encryption and decryption mechanisms.
Compared to AVISPA, ProVerif is a more expressive tool.
Furthermore, AVISPA is sufficient for abstract protocols but
ProVerif may help to model more of the Cloud infrastructure
into the protocol thus allowing more extensive properties to be
detailed and proved. Hence, ProVerif allows us to better define
what is being attacked and hence what needs to be protected.
ProVerif also features efficient automatic reasoning tools and
is therefore potentially able to verify specific properties such
as Cloud resources.
V. SECOND ATTEMPT
In our second attempt, all the stages of the proposed pro-
tocol remain the same but implemented in a different way
and tested by ProVerif [5]. ProVerif is an extension of Pi-
calculus with cryptography. It follows Dolev-Yao models [3]
of cryptographic operation. ProVerif is capable of proving
reachability properties, correspondence assertions and observa-
tional equivalence. It has a large variety of protocol structures
(event and the queries, private channels, rewrite rules, etc.) and
modelling primitives used by cryptographic protocols (encryp-
tion, decryption, digital signatures, etc.). ProVerif′s internal
abstraction uses queries to verify the security properties and
attempts to prove that there is a state in which the security
properties are known to the attacker or not [6]. If the results
of the queries are True, then the security property cannot be
derived by the attacker. Additionally, it verifies the properties
of the security protocol to prove secrecy (strong/weak), au-
thentication and observational equivalence for an unbounded
number of sessions using an unbounded message space.
A. General Notations
Table 1 represents Algorithm 2
Notation Explanation
CA Cloud A
CB Cloud B
SA Server SA on Coud A
SB New service on Cloud B
Ksc Symmetric session key
pkC/skC public and private key pairs of Cloud B
pkS/skS Public and Private key pairs of server SA
pkR/skR Public and private key pairs of The registry
Ns Nonce of SA
Nc Nonce of CB
Advc Advertisements
ResSA Requested Resources of SA
ResCB Resources of CB
M Reqc Request for migration
M Trfs Transfer of migration
M Ackc Acknowledgement of migration
sign Signature/signed by the Registry
aenc Asymmetric Encryption
enc Symmetric Encryption
Table I: Algorithm 2
B. Algorithm 2: RASP for Migration between server on Cloud
A to Cloud B
As we stated earlier, the Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 remain
the same but in Stage 3, we create a secure session key
(Ksc) [1] which is used for sessions between server SA
and Cloud CB. In addition, the same key will be used for
encryption and decryption. Server SA generates the session key
(Ksc), to start the migration request (M Reqc). By using the
session key (Ksc), Cloud CB begins the transfer (M Trfs) and
signals server SA when the transfer is completed (M Ackc).
In this second attempt, Stage 1 corresponds to step 1 of the
protocol; Stage 2 corresponds to steps 2-7; Stage 3 corresponds
to 8-11, and finally, Stage 4 corresponds to step 12. The RASP
protocol is followed in exactly the same way an outlined below
and Fig. 4 shows the steps for Cloud-to-Cloud migration of
services.
• Stage 1
1. CB → SA : Advc (CB, ResCB)
• Stage 2
2. SA → R : (SA, CB, ResCB)pkR
3. R → SA : sign((CB, pkC, ResCB), pkS)
4. SA → CB : aenc ((Ns, SA , ResSA), pkC)
5. CB → R : (CB, SA , ResSA)pkR
6. R → CB : sign((SA, pkS , ResSA), pkC)
7. CB → SA : aenc((Ns, Nc, CB), pkS)
• Stage 3
8. SA → CB : aenc((Nc, Ksc), pkC)
9. CB → SA : enc ((M Reqc, SA), Ksc)
10. SA → CB : enc ((M Trfs, ResSA), Ksc)
11. CB → SA : enc ((M Ackc), Ksc)
• Stage 4
12. SB → R : aenc((SB, CB), pkR)
C. The full explanation of this RASP protocol is given below
• Step 1 Server SA receives advertisements from Cloud
B advertising Cloud B′s resources with its identity CB.
• Step 2 Server SA checks the validity of Cloud CB
with the Registry.
• Step 3 The Registry authenticates server SA.
• Step 4 Server SA sends a migration request to Cloud
CB.
• Step 5 Cloud CB sends a request to the Registry to
make sure that server SA′s request for resources is
valid.
• Step 6 The Registry replies back to Cloud CB.
• Step 7 Cloud CB sends the migration response back
to server SA.
• Step 8 Server SA generates the session key(Ksc)to
start the migration request.
• Step 9 Cloud CB sends the migration initialisation
request.
• Step 10 Server SA does the migration transfer.
• Step 11 Cloud CB sends an acknowledgement to
server SA.
• Step 12 Service on Cloud B (SB) updates the Registry
on its new location.
Figure 4: Second Attempt Migration between SA to CB
D. Stages in detail
1) Stage 1: Cloud CB advertises (Advc) its resources which
are picked up by server SA on Cloud A. Server SA and
Cloud CB do not know anything about each other and there
is no prior communication between SA and CB. In the first
step, the server SA receives an advertisement from Cloud B
advertising its resources (ResCB) with its identity CB.
1. CB → SA : Advc (CB, ResCB)
2) Stage 2: Both entities, server SA and Cloud B, must be
authenticated to each other. Firstly, on receiving an advertise-
ment from CB, SA checks the validity of Cloud B with the
Registry. So it sends its identity SA, Cloud B′s identity, CB,
and the resources at Cloud B (ResCB) by using the public
key of Registry.The Registry will be able to verify the validity
of any Cloud resources. The Registry replies back to server
SA, saying that Cloud CB is a valid Cloud and encrypts
the response with the public key(pkS) of SA and signs the
response with its private key. Therefore, this digital signature
ensures that the Registry is the originator of the message.
SA generates and sends a fresh nonce (Ns), its identity SA,
requested resources (ResSA) and encrypts it using the public
key of Cloud B, (pkC). Nonces are used to protect this session
between the server SA and the Cloud B to which the server
wants to migrate [7]. When CB receives this message, it
decrypts the message using its private key (skC). Cloud CB
verifies the request made by SA by forwarding the requested
resources of SA (ResSA), the identity of SA and its identity,
CB, to the Registry by using the public key (pkR) of Registry.
The Registry replies back to Cloud CB, it validates server SA
and encrypts the response with Cloud CB′s public key and
signs it with its private key. Finally, Cloud B sends a message
to server SA that it can migrate to Cloud B, it acknowledges
Ns and generates a new nonce, Nc.
2. SA → R : (SA, CB, ResCB)pkR
3. R → SA : sign((CB, pkC, ResCB), pkS)
4. SA → CB : aenc ((Ns, SA , ResSA), pkC)
5. CB → R : (CB, SA , ResSA)pkR
6. R → CB : sign((SA, pkS , ResSA), pkC)
7. CB → SA : aenc((Ns, Nc, CB), pkS)
3) Stage 3: In Stage 3, server SA generates a fresh symmetric
session key (Ksc), pairs it with the nonce generated by CB
(Nc), encrypts the message by using Cloud Bs public key
(pkC) and sends to CB. Cloud B initiates the migration request
(M Reqc), pairs it with server SA, and encrypts it using the
generated symmetric session key (Ksc). Once the migration
request from CB to SA is received, SA is able to decrypt it
using the shared key (Ksc) and starts the migration transfer
(M Trfs) with the requested resource (ResSA) by using the
symmetrical session key (Ksc). Once the migration transfer
is completed, CB sends an acknowledgement (M Ackc), to
server SA which is encrypted using Ksc.
8. SA → CB : aenc((Nc, Ksc), pkC)
9. CB → SA : enc ((M Reqc, SA), Ksc)
10. SA → CB : enc ((M Trfs, ResSA), Ksc)
11. CB → SA : enc ((M Ackc), Ksc)
4) Stage 4: In Stage 4, the service (SB) updates the Registry
on its new location and hence SA → SB.
12. SB → R : aenc((SB, CB), pkR)
E. Evaluation of the Second Attempt
In our second attempt, by using symmetric session key (Ksc),
the requested service is transferred to the new location CB. As
we mentioned in the first attempt, nonces are used to protect
the session between server SA and Cloud CB. However, in the
second attempt, the symmetrical session key is used to do the
actual transfer. Hence, this is a more secure mechanism than
using nonces for the actual data transfer.
F. ProVerif Results
The results show that RASP can preserve the secrecy, authen-
tication and key exchange of the service migration mechanism.
We verified Stage 2 and Stage 3 using the ProVerif tool and
present the output of the program which is given in Figure
5 below. The security properties were specified in the input
language to check whether it is derivable by the attacker or
not.
Results in Terminal:proverif/opam/system/bin/proverif1.98pl1
docs/Nee/CB toSA SecuirtyProtocol.pvgrep ”RES”.
Figure 5: Second Attempt results using Proverif
1) Nonces are secured and not derived by the attacker:
• RESULT not attacker bitstring (SNs []) is true.
• RESULT not attacker bitstring (SNc []) is true.
• RESULT not attacker bitstring (CNs []) is true.
• RESULT not attacker bitstring (CNc []) is true.
2) The session key is not derived by the attacker:
• RESULT not attacker key (Ksc [m3 = v 1975, m1 =
v 1976, hostX = v 1977! 1 = v 1978]) is true.
• RESULT not attacker bitstring (SNk []) is true.
• RESULT not attacker bitstring (CNk []) is true.
3) Private keys of SA & CB is not derived by the attacker:
• RESULT not attacker skey (skC []) is true.
• RESULT not attacker skey (skS []) is true.
4) Authentication SA to CB and CB to SA is true:
• RESULT inj-event (endSparam (x 4663))→ inj-event
(beginSparam (x 4663)) is true.
• RESULT inj-event (endCparam (x 5762))→ inj-event
(beginCparam (x 5762)) is true.
VI. APPLICATION TO VEHICULAR TESTBED
The rapid growth in the number of vehicles on the roads has
created a plethora of challenges for road traffic management
authorities such as traffic congestion, increasing number of
accidents, air pollution, etc. Over the last decade, significant re-
search efforts from both the automotive industry and academia
have been undertaken to accelerate the deployment of the
Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) standard
based on a Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC)
among moving vehicles (Vehicle-to-Vehicle, V2V) and road-
side infrastructure (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure, V2I) [14]. This
network is called a VANET network and is characterised
by high node speed, rapidly changing topologies, and short
connection lifetimes. VANETs are realised by the deployment
of Roadside Units (RSUs) located along the transport infras-
tructure and Onboard Units (OBUs) in the vehicles or worn
by pedestrians or cyclists. Based on the protocol presented,
which was verified using Proverif, VANET systems would be
the best option on which to implement the Resource Allocation
Security Protocol. Hence, the protocol will be tested on a
VANET testbed developed by Middlesex University on its
Hendon Campus.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has presented a new Resource Allocation Security
Protocol (RASP) for server migration between commercial
Cloud environments. In our first attempt, using AVISPA tool,
we showed that the protocol is safe under normal operation;
the present protocol critically prevents impersonation attacks
either by rogue Cloud infrastructure hoping to sneer valid
services or by malicious servers wanting to inflict damage on
Cloud Infrastructure. In our second attempt, using ProVerif, we
showed that the proposed protocol succeeds in three significant
security properties namely: secrecy, authentication of SA to
CB and CB to SA, and secure symmetric key exchange. More
work is being done to analyse intruder attacks to show that the
proposed protocol is secure against active and passive attacks.
We are also exploring how this protocol can be enhanced to
prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
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